The perception that it is necessary to choose between a nihilistic 'anything goes' postmodernism and an absolutist objectivism has bewitched much of the contemporary philosophical discussion on historiography and beyond. This book has tried to show the way in which historiography, and specifically its main cognitive products, can be evaluated and ranked rationally, but without a commitment to the correspondence theory of truth. Postnarrativist philosophy of historiography endorses the initial insight of narrativism that the texts and entire books of history are the main knowledge contributions of historiography and must be the subjects of philosophical analysis, but it understands them as exemplifying historiographical reasoning for theses of history .
I have introduced a number of new concepts or novel applications of old concepts in this book. This coda provides a brief code for postnarrativist discourse on historiography. The transition from narrativism means regarding historiography as a type of rational practice and not as a kind of narrative storytelling. Historiography attempts to produce s ynthesizing or colligatory views on the past. These are the most original and expressive contributions of the discipline. Historians attempt to persuade others to accept the views put forward in their books. Persuasion may be manifested in many forms, from explicit reasoning from premises to conclusions to narrative storytelling, to rebuttals of rival positions, to exemplifications, etc. Ultimately, all such forms are subservient to the thesis or theses defended and historians try to credit their theses with as high a level of epistemic authority as possible.
The identification of the historical text as an informal argumentative entity means rejecting holism regarding historiographical theses. The content of a text of history can be seen as divided into the meaning -constituting elements of a historiographical thesis and the evidence for it, although the distinction is not clear-cut. In other words, the meaning-constituting elements may enable one to understand the evidence better, while more extensive evidence makes the meaning of what is claimed clearer. Nevertheless, this 'molecularist' position entails that there are elements in any historiographical text that are inessential for the understanding of the main historiographical thesis and that serve the evidentiary function . On the other hand, there is always room for an evidential deepening and a multitude of choices as to how to make the case for any thesis.
Historiography identified as a discursive and argumentative practice also explains the abandonment of representationalism in favor of non-representationalism . It is not reasonable to look for abstract entities that are re-presented once the correspondence relation between the historical reality and historiographical thesis is rejected. Historiography is presentational and constructivist , not re-presentational and re-constructivist. The availability of rational standards of evaluation explains why any fears that 'anything goes' are baseless. A historian's construct can be seen as epistemically authoritative if it is seen to be fit with respect to all dimensions of cognitive justification: the rhetorical, the epistemic and the discursive . That is, the text is a persuasive manifestation of reasoning for a thesis; it is an exemplary employment of epistemic values , including references to actual historical objects with regard to non-colligatory expressions; and it is a successful argumentative intervention in the relevant argumentative context . In this kind of case, a historiographical text has a rational warrant that gives it the epistemic authority for what is stated. Further, any text is an argumentative speech act and, in the ideal case, readers feel rationally compelled to accept the reasoning of the historian and the historian's conclusion.
Although higher-order historiographical knowledge, synthesizing and colligatory theses are constructions, they can be seen as real if they have an appropriate justification and rational warrant. Skepticism and doubt regarding their reality emerges not on the level of historical research, but on the meta-level of the philosophy of historiography. Rationally warranted historiographical theses concerning historical phenomena are real with respect to the historical world, although their status as object-sided entities may be questioned in philosophical analysis. The point is that the job of historians, like that of scientists, is to find the best possible characterizations and constructions of their object world and not to ponder primarily what the relation of historiography and its
